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Abstract – In order to enable an agent to co-ordinate its
activities with other agents and to participate in coalitions,
one of the elements to take into account in its conception
should be a social reasoning mechanism that allows the
agent to reason about the other agents. This paper presents
a social reasoning mechanism that extends, in some
aspects, the models presented in previous works. Such a
model supports the agent’s reasoning concerning other
agents, using notions of social dependence. In order to
deal with concrete situations, where the agent’s
knowledge is limited, a new perspective of coalition
formation is presented in which the agents may not have
knowledge of all the relevant details to realize their goals.
The main concepts underlying the proposed social
reasoning mechanism are presented, followed by an
overview of the respective formal model, and some
aspects related to the implementation of a system based
on this model.
Keywords: coalition formation, coalition selection,
coordination, distributed artificial intelligence, multi-
agent systems, social reasoning.
1. INTRODUCTION
In a society of heterogeneous agents, with different
goals and capacities, the agents may not be autonomous to
reach some of their goals, that is, they may be unable to
carry out some of the necessary activities. To achieve a
goal for which it is not autonomous, an agent needs to
delegate the accomplishment of activities to other agents
of the society. In turn, in a general situation, it cannot be
assumed that the agents are benevolent, that is, that they
accept to carry out activities for other agents without
some counterpart. Therefore, how can an agent obtain that
another agent accepts the realization of an activity for its
interest or the interest of both?
The theory of dependence [3][4][5] tries to answer this
question, and it has been the direction followed by some
previous works like those presented in [6][13]. In [13]
Sichman presents a social reasoning mechanism based on
the theory of dependence leading to a dynamic conception
of agent societies. This means that coalitions are formed
in a dynamic way whenever the necessity of coordination,
to achieve some goal, is identified. However, this has
some limitations, which render difficult its use for the
resolution of concrete problems, typically of large
complexity.
The social reasoning model presented in this paper
addresses some of these limitations, being able to be used
in societies of agents with different types of organization,
and in concrete problems, where the complexity level is
typically large, needing therefore an analysis at different
levels of abstraction, as proposed in our approach.
In the following, we will present a model of social
reasoning that enforces a local perspective of coalition
formation, leading to the emergence of nested coalitions.
We also discuss several issues related to the
implementation of this model, as it is realized in the
CADS system. Besides referring the agents’ architecture,
communication language and interaction protocol, we
also focus other aspects relevant to the operationalization
of the model, such as activity scheduling and concurrent
access to resources. These two aspects, albeit not being
basic for the elaboration of an agent architecture based on
the presented model, are of great relevance for the
implementation of concrete systems, in order to allow
dealing with the time constraints associated with the
activities of a plan and with the sharing of resources.
2. MODELS OF SOCIAL REASONING
The models of social reasoning, from which our work
derives, draw upon the theory of dependence. According
to this theory, dependence and power relations between
the agents are the basis to explain how agents interact in
order to cooperate and accept to help others.
In [13] Sichman presents a social reasoning model
where an agent is able to reason about the other agents to
identify the respective dependence situations. For that, an
agent uses information about the goals, actions, resources
and plans of each agent, which is stored in a data structure
called external description.
The dependence situations are classified according to
two criteria. One criterion depends on the goal being
analyzed [12][13]:
- unilateral: an agent agi infer that it depends on
another agent agj for a goal gk, but agj does not
depend on agi;
- mutual: an agent agi and an agent agj infer that they
depend on each other for the same goal gk;
- reciprocal: an agent agi infers that it depends on
another agent agj for a goal gk, and the agent agj
depends on agi for another goal gl, different from gk.
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The other criterion depends on the sets of plans used in
the reasoning process:
- locally believed: if an agent uses exclusively its own
plans when inferring the dependence situations;
- mutually believed: if an agent uses its plans and those
of the other agent when inferring the dependence
situations.
Based on the resulting taxonomy of dependence
situations defined, a decision criterion is proposed to
choose the most appropriate partners to contact in order to
help the agent achieve the goals for which it is not
autonomous [11][13].
Another model that uses notions based on dependence
relations among the agents is presented by E. Alonso in
[1][2]. In this model the agents first recognize how they
depend on each other and then negotiate by exchanging
offers to reach an agreement where social interlocking
commitments are adopted. However the negotiation is a
bilateral process not supporting the formation of
multipartner coalitions.
Despite the interest of the approaches presented in
these works, there are several issues that can be deepened,
namely:
- the problem of coalitions formation and selection –
how to select the agents to contact in each coalition
and how to choose the best coalition to achieve the
intended goals;
- the problem of agents’ limitations, either in
knowledge or in reasoning – an agent may not know
the characteristics of all the agents of the society, and
if it knows, the reasoning concerning all that
information may not be feasible;
- the problem of reducing the communication effort – to
establish a coalition an agent needs to communicate
with other agents, this communication effort increases
considerably as the number of involved agents
increases, therefore it is important to reduce this effort
to allow the implementation of concrete systems based
on communication channels with limited capacity.
The work of Sichman [13] has been further extended
by David [6] to incorporate the notion of action
dependence networks, based on and and or dependencies
such as multiparty, multigoal, multiaction, alternative
plan and alternative partner dependencies. The extensions
proposed by David [6][7] present interesting aspects,
namely, by proposing new criteria for selecting partners
and by supporting multipartner coalitions. However, some
aspects of the three problems previously referred remain
present, as will be seen later.
In the following sections we will discuss these issues
and present a social reasoning model that contributes to
address them, as well as other problems related namely to
the implementation of real systems. In section 6 is
presented one implementation of our model, the CADS
system, which supported the simulation in which the
example presented in section 7 is based. This example
illustrates the ability and versatility of the proposed model
for use in real distributed problem solving activities,
within open and dynamic multi-agent system
environments.
3. SOCIAL REASONING AND COALITION
FORMATION
Let us consider an agent ag1 and its goal o1, for which
ag1 has a plan that involves the accomplishment of the
activities a1, a2, a3. What should ag1 do, for example, if it
doesn't have the capacity to accomplish any of those
activities? In that case, the agent will have to delegate to
other agents of the society the accomplishment of those
activities.
In the social reasoning mechanism proposed by
Sichman [13] the agent would try to establish bilateral
commitments for each of the activities, just as depicted in
figure 1.
ag1
ag3ag2 ag4
a1 a2 a3
o1 : a1,a2,a3
bilateral
commitment
Fig. 1: Delegation of activities through bilateral
commitments.
However, this approach has some problems, namely:
- the existence of a coalition of several agents, as a
whole, is not explicitly represented, since the focus is
on the establishment of bilateral commitments. In this
way it is not possible to ponder the global interest of a
coalition in order to allow the definition of criteria for
coalitions selection, instead of selecting individual
partners;
- in the case that the delegation of one of the activities
fails after the establishment of commitments for
delegation of other connected activities, a way of
dealing with the commitments already assumed is not
defined.
Another subject that is necessary to take into account
has to do with the scope of the agent's social reasoning.
Let us consider an agent ag1 and its goal o1, for which this
agent has a plan that involves the accomplishment of the
activities a1, a2, a3, being autonomous for a1 and a3 and
not autonomous for a2. Let us consider that another agent
ag2 has the capacity to accomplish a2, but to achieve a2 it
needs to accomplish two other activities a2.1 and a2.2, for
which it is not autonomous. In this case a2 is an activity
that cannot be delegated for direct execution, because its
accomplishment implies the accomplishment of other
(sub)activities that, in turn, must be delegated. Figure 2
illustrates this situation.
ag1
ag2
a2
o1 : a1,a2,a3
ag4ag3
a2.1 a2.2
a2 : a2.1,a2.2
Fig. 2: Indirect delegation of activities.
In a situation like this one, the agent ag1 would have
to reason not only about agent ag2, but also about agents
ag3 and ag4, and about the dependence situation of ag2 in
relation to ag3 and ag4, and, possibly, in relation to other
agents of the society. A reasoning of this type produces an
undesirable effect, which is the combinatory complexity
of the computation [13]. In this kind of situation an agent
must answer two questions:
- Is there any coalition that allows reaching the
intended goal?
- in the case of an affirmative answer to the previous
question, which agents to contact for the formation of
the coalition?
In [8] it is demonstrated that the answer to any one of
these questions is a NP-complete problem that, in the
general case, cannot be answered in practical terms.
To deal with this problem in the social reasoning
model presented by Sichman [13], an agent reasons about
its dependence in relation to another agent, but doesn’t
have the capacity to reason about the dependence
situation of this other agent in relation to a third one. On
the other hand, the actions are always considered as
“atomic” actions, directly executable. Therefore the
agent's plans must be completely detailed. The reasoning
process uses these completely detailed plans to globally
and directly reason about all the other agents of the
society.
In spite of this approach limiting the problem of the
computational complexity, it also limits the potential for
coalition formation in a society. That is, there may exist
goals for which an agent is incapable to infer the
existence of a successful coalition, despite the fact that
there may be agents in the society with the necessary
capacities.
4. PROPOSED MODEL
The proposed model is based on a perspective distinct
from the previous ones, in which the achievement of a
goal may result in a chain of several nested coalitions.
An agent, when reasoning about the other agents to
establish a coalition, can adopt two different perspectives:
- a global perspective, which corresponds to a reasoning
about all the dependence relationships among the
agents that can participate in the coalition (including
those involved in delegations that are not direct);
- a local perspective, in which the agent doesn’t know
all the details related to the accomplishment of the
intended goal, nor does it have knowledge about all
the agents of the society.
Fig. 3: Different perspectives of coalition formation:
(a) global; (b) local.
With an approach based on a local perspective, the
achievement of a goal for which an agent is not
autonomous may originate, not only one coalition, but a
group of nested coalitions that, if succeeded, will have as
result the achievement of the initial goal, as exemplified
in figure 4.
ag1
ag3
ag2 ag4
a1
a2’
a3
o1 : a1,a2’,a3
ag6ag5
a2.2 a2.3
a2’ : a2.1,a2.2,a2.3
Coalition 1
Coalition 2
Fig. 4: Nested coalitions.
When adopting a local perspective the computational
complexity underlying the social reasoning mechanism is
bounded, without limiting the potential of coalitions
formation in a society of agents.
Another important aspect of the approach presented in
this paper is related to the organization of agent societies.
For instance in [6] David proposes an organization based
on groups (or agencies), as depicted in figure 5.
ag1
ag3
ag2 ag4
a1
a2’
a3
o1 : a1,a2’,a3
ag6ag5
a2.2 a2.3
a2’ : a2.1,a2.2,a2.3
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ag3
ag2 ag4
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a2’
a3
o1 : a1,a2’,a3
ag6ag5
a2.2 a2.3
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ag1 ag2
ag3
ag4
Agency c1
ag10 ag11
ag12
ag13
Agency c3
ag5 ag6
ag7
ag9
Agency c2
Agent
exit
ag8
coalition
coalition
Society
Social Reasoning Mechanism
Agent
entrance
Fig. 5: Society as a group of agencies [6].
When an agent enters the society, it selects one of the
groups to join. When joining a group the agent starts by
knowing the agent’s capacities of that group and,
therefore, takes advantage of those capacities to reach its
goals. However, the agent knows nothing about the agents
of other groups. In order to resolve this problem in [6] it
is proposed that an agent can belong, simultaneously, to
more than one group. However, when belonging to
several groups, the agent needs to know, and therefore
communicate with, all the agents of those groups, giving
away the potential benefits of organizing a society in
groups.
ag1 ag2
ag3
ag4
Agency c1
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ag7
ag9
Agency c2
ag8
coalition 1
Society
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Fig. 6: Nested coalitions involving different agencies.
With our approach an agent doesn't need to know all
the agents in a group to take advantage of the capacities
of that group. For instance one group may have one or
several representatives of the capacities of the group. In
this way an agent can join a group and have knowledge of
potential capacities of other groups, without needing to
join all the groups and to know all the agents in each
group. An agent can even establish coalitions involving
agents of different groups, without having knowledge
about all the agents in the involved groups, just as
presented in figure 6. Thus, the coalition formation
approach now proposed, by adopting a local perspective,
where the analysis of the accomplishment of the activities
can be made at different levels of detail, allows a great
versatility in the process of coalitions establishment,
namely, supporting the formation of nested coalitions. In
this way the agents do not need to have detailed
knowledge about the way the involved activities are
ultimately accomplished. This approach makes possible
the use of a social reasoning mechanism, based on the
agents’ complementarity, to deal with concrete problems,
with diverse organization characteristics.
It is now possible to address the three problems
previously referred:
- coalition formation and selection: in the proposed
model the coalition notion is represented in a explicit
way, therefore can be referred to as a whole either in
the coalition selection process or in the negotiation
process;
- agents’ limitations: by supporting the formation of
nested coalitions an agent does not need to have
knowledge of all the agents needed to accomplish the
intended goals nor the details of all the activities
involved, and does not need to reason about all the
agents involved. This is achieved without limiting the
potential of coalition formation in a society of agents.
- reducing the communication effort: by using a local
scope in the social reasoning process an agent does
not need to know all the agents necessary to achieve
its goals, so the number of agents it needs to contact
to establish a coalition is greatly reduced, therefore
minimizing the communication effort.
5. COALITION FORMATION
The proposed coalition formation process involves
three main elements:
- the existence of a representation of the agents’
characteristics that supports the underlying aspects of
this approach;
- a social reasoning mechanism that, based in the
adopted representation, allows the agents to elaborate
coalition hypotheses, and to choose the most
interesting among those several hypotheses;
- an interaction mechanism among agents, that supports
the establishment of coalitions.
Representation of the agents’ characteristics
To reason about the others an agent needs to know
their characteristics and must represent this information
internally. In [13] Sichman defined formally and
implemented the concept of external description which
stores believed information about the others. This
information is represented as a structure that holds for
every agent, including itself, one entry composed of the
following elements [12]:
- goals: the goals an agent wants to achieve;
- actions: the actions an agent is able to perform;
- resources: the resources an agent has control upon;
- plans: the plans an agent has, using actions and
resources, in order to achieve a certain goal.
In this representation the actions are considered
“atomic” and directly executable, leading to plans that
detail all actions and resources necessary to reach the
respective goal. However, this formulation of external
description is not adequate to support our model, since it
is admitted that the agent doesn't know the exact way of
accomplishment of a goal, that is, the agent doesn’t know
in detail all the actions that are necessary to achieve a
certain goal, which is not considered in the previous
models. Therefore, it is necessary to reformulate the
external description. The formulation proposed is based
on three main elements to characterize an agent: goals,
plans and capacities. Although goals and plans also exist
in the previous formulations, their meaning and,
essentially, their representation and manipulation is
substantially different.
Capacities
Since a formulation based on the notions action and
resource is not adequate to support our model, we need a
concept that describes the capacities of an agent in terms
of activities that it is able to perform, and the resources it
controls. The proposed concept is designated capacity. In
the context of dependence theory the definition of
capacity can be made in a sense similar to power,
restricted to the accomplishment of activities, in the
following way: an agent has a capacity c if the agent as
the power of c. In terms of the proposed model, capacity
corresponds to a relationship among an agent and an
activity that an agent is able to accomplish, either directly,
in the case of primitive activities directly executable by
the agent, or indirectly, in the case of non-primitive
activities for which the agent has an accomplishment
plan, which can imply the delegation of activities to other
agents.
Goals
The approaches presented by Sichman and David
[13][6] consider the goal adoption process in an
instrumental perspective, that is, an agent adopts a goal of
another agent since that brings it some benefit, namely,
the possibility of achievement of its own goals. However,
this adoption is represented in an implicit way, since the
agent doesn't add explicitly the adopted goal to its
external description. In our approach, this implicit
representation is not enough, due to the possibility of
indirect delegation. Therefore, in our model, when an
agent accepts the delegation of a non-primitive activity, it
explicitly adopts the accomplishment of that activity as
one of its own goals. In this way it assumes the
responsibility for its accomplishment and it deals with it,
as with any of its original goals, using the same reasoning
mechanism to identify possible coalitions for its
achievement.
Plans
The plans define strategies for action, involving the
agents’ capacities, to reach the intended goals. However,
in the formulations presented by Sichman and David
[13][6] the process of social reasoning is based on actions
and resources, and doesn’t consider the possibility to
characterize the goals and the respective plans, through
different levels of detail successively more refined. This
possibility of successive detailing of the plans is of great
importance in order to support the formation of nested
coalitions for the achievement of a goal, such as proposed
in the approach now presented. Therefore, the proposed
plan representation is based on a hierarchical structure
[10][14], where the plans are characterized by collections
of activities that, in turn, can be decomposed. Having this
in mind it is possible to define the plans in a hierarchical
way, which correspond to strategies of activity realization
in order to reach a main goal. An activity can, in turn,
correspond to a plan that implies the accomplishment of
several other activities. Figure 7 gives an idea of the
representation proposed.
activity 1 activity 2
 
activity 3
 
activity 4
 
activity 31 activity 32 . . .
 
activity 3n 
Plan A:
Plan B:
Fig. 7: Representation of plans in a hierarchical way.
Social reasoning mechanism
Once defined the representation that an agent
possesses of the other agents, it is now necessary to define
the mechanisms to explore that knowledge, designated,
generically, by social reasoning mechanism [13]. The
social reasoning mechanism proposed is composed by
three main elements:
- dependence analysis: the dependence situations of an
agent in relation to the other agents of the society are
identified;
- coalition formation: based on the identified
dependence situations and on the agent's plans,
acceptable coalitions to reach the agent's goals are
elaborated;
- coalition ordering: the elaborated acceptable
coalitions are ordered according to defined criteria, in
order to allow the agent to choose the most favorable.
Figure 8 gives an idea how these three elements are
related.
 
External 
Description 
Dependence 
Situations 
Ordered 
Acceptable 
Coalitions 
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Coalitions 
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Fig. 8: Social reasoning mechanism of an agent.
The process of dependence analysis corresponds to
the identification of dependence situations in relation to
other agents, for the goals to achieve, and based on the
selected plans. To make this possible it is necessary to
consider two preliminary aspects: goal selection and plan
selection1.
The coalition formation is based on the information
produced by the dependence analysis process, in terms of
goals, plans, and dependence situations. From that, the
possible coalitions, which allow reaching the intended
goals, are generated. The coalitions resulting from this
process are designated acceptable coalitions. That group
of acceptable coalitions is the input for the coalition
ordering process, in which the agent evaluate the different
coalitions, and order them according to the evaluation
criteria.
As a result of this whole process, the agent will have
elaborated and ordered, according to an evaluation
criteria, a group of coalitions that could allow the
accomplishment of the agent’ goals. After the completion
of this process, in the negotiation phase [9], the selected
coalitions will be proposed to the involved agents for their
establishment.
Overview of the proposed model formal structure
Having presented an overview of our model, the
formal structure of some of the concepts previously
presented will now be discussed.
One of the main concepts underlying the proposed
model is the external description concept that, as above-
mentioned, characterizes an agent in terms of goals, plans
and capacities. Considering the perspective of an agent
agi the external description (EXTagi) that it has from
another agent agj is defined as follows2.
                                                       
1
 Not considered in this paper.
2
 In this paper only an overview of the formal model is presented, a
detailed description can be found in [9].
EXTagi(agj) ≡def {GOALagi(agj), CAPagi(agj), PLANagi(agj)}
GOAL, CAP and PLAN are sets defined as follows.
- GOALagi(agj) ≡def {g | ext_goal(agi, agj, g)}
- CAPagi(agj) ≡def {a | ext_cap(agi, agj, a)}
- PLANagi(agj) ≡ def {p | ext_plan(agi, agj, p)}
The predicates ext_goal, ext_cap and ext_plan are defined
as follows.
- ext_goal(agi, agj, g) : succeeds if g is a goal of agj
that agi knows;
- ext_cap(agi, agj, a) : succeeds if a is a capacity of agj
that agi knows;
- ext_plan(agi, agj, p) : succeeds if p is a plan of agj
that agi knows.
Social autonomy
An agent agi is autonomous for a goal gk based on a
plan pqk if and only if agi has a goal gk and is able to
accomplish all the activities of this plan. Formally3:
))())((()(),,( iqkikqkki agCAPapACTaagGOALgpgaggaut ∈∈∀∧∈⇔
An agent agi is autonomous for a goal gk based on a
set of plans of an agent agq if and only if agi is
autonomous for, at least, one of the plans of this set.
Formally:
)),,())(((),,( qkkiqqkqki pgaggautagPLANpaggagGAUT ∈∃⇔
Social Dependence
An agent agi is dependent on another agent agj for a
goal gk based on a plan pqk if and only if agi has a goal gk,
agi is not autonomous for the plan pqk, and the agent agj is
able to accomplish some of the activities of this plan that
agi cannot accomplish. Formally:
))()())(((                                             
),,(                                             
)(),,,(
jiqk
qkki
ikqkkji
agCAPaagCAPapACTa
pgaggaut
agGOALgpgagaggdep
∈∧∉∈∃
∧¬
∧∈⇔
An agent agi is dependent on another agent agj for a
goal gk based on a set of plans of an agent agq if and only
if agi has a goal gk, agi is not autonomous for the goal gk
based on this set of plans, and agi is dependent of agj for,
at least, one of the plans of this set. Formally:
)),,,())(((                                                
),,(),,,(
qkkjiqqk
qkiqkji
pgagaggdepagPLANp
aggagGAUTaggagagGDEP
∈∃
∧¬⇔
                                                       
3
 ACT represents the set of activities of a plan.
Delegation and coalition
When an agent doesn’t have the capacity to carry out
some activity to reach one of its goals, it needs to delegate
this activity to another agent that might accept to
collaborate with it. To facilitate the collaboration the
proponent agent can offer some counterparts to the
helping agent. Formally, let us consider the set Ag of all
the agents of the society, and the set CAg of all the
capacities of the agents of the society, defined as follows:
))}()((|{ iidef agCAPaAgagaCAg ∈∈∃≡
The delegation of an activity a from an agent agi to
another agent agj, offering a set of counterparts o,
eventually empty (when the agent has nothing to offer),
can be seen as a tuple:
(agi, agj, a,o) ∈ Ag × Ag × CAg × 2CAg
That is, two agents agi, agj collaborate to reach a goal
(the agent agi delegates to agj an activity a offering as
counterparts o). The counterparts are important, because it
is through them that the influence power of one agent to
the other is reflected. This aspect is directly related with
the dependence relations existing between the agents.
Let us consider the set deleg(agi, gk, pqk) that
represents all the hypotheses of delegation of activities
from one plan pqk,  by an agent agi, to other agents of the
society to achieve a goal gk for which agi is not
autonomous. Formally4:
))},,()()((                                     
)()()(                                     
),,,(                                     
|),,,{(),,(
nijinn
jiqk
qkkji
jidefqkki
oagagadepagCAPo oo
agCAPaagCAPapACTa
pgagaggdep
oaagagpgagdeleg
∧∈∈∀
∧∈∧∉∧∈
∧
≡
That is, deleg is composed by all the delegation
hypotheses for wich the agent agi is dependent on other
agents, whose offered counterparts corresponds to actions
that the other agents depend on agi.
Coalition
One coalition corresponds to a set of delegation
hypotheses, therefore a subset of the set of all the
coalition hypotheses, except the empty set. However,
some of this sets of delegations are not (valid) coalitions,
for instance if they do not consider all the activities
needed to achieve the related goal, or if the same activity
is delegated to more than one agent. Therefore we need to
define which are the valid coalitions.
Let’s consider the predicate colig(c, agi, gk, pqk) that
succeeds if c is a valid coalition to reach the goal gk using
the plan pqk. Formally:
                                                       
4
 adep(agi,agj,a) is a predicate that succeeds if agi depends on agj
for the accomplishment of the activity a.
))()())(((                                        
))(),,,((                                        
)),,,((),,,(
cactivaagCAPapACTa
aaagagcoaagag
coaagagpgagccolig
iqk
nmkjnnki
mmjiqkki
∈∨∈∈∀
∧≠→≠∈∀
∈∀⇔
In this definition activ(c) represents the set of all the
activities of a coalition c.
Once defined the coalition notion, it is now possible to
define the set COLIG of all coalitions that, in the agent
agi perspective, allows to reach a goal gk based on a set of
plans Pqk. Formally:
))},,,()((|{),,( qkkiqkqkdefqkki pgagccoligPpcPgagCOLIG ∈∃≡
Based on this set of coalitions an agent can aply a
selection criterion to choose the better coalitions to reach
its goals. In [9] some new selection criteria are proposed
that take advantadge of the coalition notion.
6. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL
The main goal of the implementation that has been
made (CADS system [9]) is to allow the realization of
concrete agents able to use the knowledge concerning
themselves and the other agents, to reach their goals based
on predefined plans of execution. In that sense, the social
reasoning mechanism is one of the key elements of the
agents’ internal organization. However, in a broad
perspective, other elements may be important, as is the
case of perception, execution, and planning, among
others. Therefore, a special attention was given to the
modularity of the organization proposed, in order to
facilitate a possible expansion or adaptation to new
circumstances. The importance of the modularity is
reinforced by the fact that the agents could present
different types of “character”, having distinct approaches
to the evaluation of plans and coalitions. For instance, an
agent can give more importance to the cost of executing
the activities, and another agent can value preferentially
the duration of the activities. Thus, it is important that
specific modules can be altered, or dynamically adapted,
without affecting the general operation of the system.
Planning and time
In the context of the social reasoning model presented
above, the plans were characterized as collections of
activities where the execution order is not relevant.
However, when applied to concrete problems, the
execution order is typically of great importance. The
adopted representation is based on partial ordered plans.
Each partial ordered plan is a tuple that consists in a set A
of activities, and a set R of order constraints over these
activities. Each order constraint has the form a < b,
which means that the activity a must be concluded before
the activity b can start.
Therefore a plan p for the achievement of a goal gk is
described as follows:
),,( RAgp kdef≡
For instance:
(g1, {a1, a2, a3}, {a1<a2, a1<a3})
is a plan to achieve goal g1, and is composed by the
activities {a1, a2, a3}, where a1 must be concluded
before a2 starts, and a1 must be concluded before a3
starts.
In this way it is possible to define plans where a total
ordering of the activities is not imposed, allowing the
formation of distinct execution sequences and, therefore,
the formation of distinct coalitions, from which an agent
can choose the most suitable. Taking as an example the
previous plan, this plan could originate two execution
sequences, as schematized in figure 9.
This aspect of partial ordering of the activities has
great importance if we consider the fact that the activities
of a plan could be accomplished by several agents, and
therefore possibly executed in parallel. Therefore, the
partial ordering of the activities of a plan is fundamental
to allow a larger flexibility in the accomplishment of the
activities in a concurrent way.
a1 a2 a3
a1 < a2
a1 < a3
Execution sequence 1
a1
a3
a2
a1 < a3
a1 < a2
Execution sequence 2
Fig. 9: Possible execution sequences of a plan.
Scheduling of activities
Another aspect of great relevance for the resolution of
concrete problems is the issue of time, namely, the
beginning and ending points in time of each activity
involved in a plan. The presented approach is based on
the use of time constraints.
The following aspects are taken into account:
- each activity has associated a certain duration;
- each agent has associated a certain time
availability;
- an agent cannot perform several activities
simultaneously5;
- activities that correspond to the management of
resources have their own time availability;
- the goals can have an execution interval
associated;
- the order constraints of a plan should be
guaranteed.
To support these aspects, for each plan is defined a set
of time constraints that should be guaranteed. Those time
constraints are reflected in the beginning and ending
points of each of the plan activities. In that way, the
elaboration of a coalition results in the definition of the
beginning and ending points for each activity to be
accomplished, as well as the definition of which agent
should accomplish that activity. In the coalition
establishment process the activities are assigned to the
agents with capacity to perform them, maintaining each
agent a calendar to record the primitive activities to
execute and when. In turn, the non-primitive activities are
adopted as goals to reach, which should be executed in
between a certain time interval. An agent, when accepting
the accomplishment of a given activity, will have its time
availability reduced according to the beginning and the
duration of that activity, since it is assumed that an agent
can’t perform activities in parallel.
Agent interaction
Another aspect that an agent's architecture should
consider is the capacity to communicate with the
remaining agents. The communication allows the agents
to exchange information and to coordinate their activities.
Since the proposed type of society organization is a
decentralized organization, a common memory doesn’t
exist, and the communication has to be supported on
message exchanging mechanisms. The communication
among agents is modeled as communication acts that can
modify the internal state of the receiving agent, that in
turn could lead to the revision of its action plans, or to
modify its beliefs.
The interaction model proposed is based on the
definition of a communication language among agents,
where the interactions are based on message exchanging,
whose sequence obeys to well defined rules, specified by
a communication protocol [9].
                                                       
5
 This assumption was introduced in order to reduce the complexity
of the implementation.
7. AN EXAMPLE
To exemplify how the proposed model could be
applied to resolve concrete problems, we now present an
overview of a simulation that has been made with the
CADS system. This simulation consists of a
simplification of a situation where several R&D
organizations, grouped in communities, collaborate to
develop projects in their interest areas. Each organization
is represented by one or more agents who interact to reach
the goals of the organization represented. The context
defined for the simulation is the following:
Two R&D communities are considered, one with
interests in the area of database systems and decision
support systems, and another with interests in the area of
artificial intelligence, in particular in the areas of
machine learning and neural networks. The first
community (Community A) is composed of two
organizations, one specialized in the areas of database
systems (DBS) and another specialized in the area of data
warehousing (DW). The second community (Community
B) represents organizations whose main area of interest
is artificial intelligence, and is composed of four
organizations, two of them specialized in the area of
neural networks (NN), one specialized in the area of
machine learning (ML), and a fourth one that acts as a
representative of this community (AI).
An organization can be formed by human agents,
computational agents, or by agents of both types,
however, in the presented simulation context, this aspect
is not relevant. In fact, a specific agent represents each of
these organizations. Figure 10 illustrates the proposed
context.
- Organization
- AgentComunity A
Comunity B
DBS
DW
AI
ML
NN-1
NN-2
Fig. 10: Base context for the simulation.
Each agent has goals, plans, and capacities. For
instance the agent representing the DBS organization has
the following description:
Fig. 11: Description of agent DBS.
Each agent, after being activated, establishes
communication with the other agents of the society to
obtain the information needed to reason about the
different hypotheses of achievement of its goals. When an
agent has this information, it can identify its dependence
situations in relation to the other agents of the society. To
understand this process, let us consider agent’s DBS
perspective to achieve the goal DecisionSupSystem. We
must note that, in the context of the proposed system, the
societies of agents are dynamic, so the agents can enter
and leave at any instant. Therefore, initially agent DBS
tries to contact with agents representing the other
communities, as is the case of agent AI which represents
the community B. In the case of community A there is no
representative, so agent DBS must contact all
community's elements, in this case just agent DW.
In this situation, taking into account the agents'
characteristics, each of the agents infers the dependence
situations represented in figure 12.
After the several coalition hypotheses have been
identified and ordered, it is then possible to begin the
negotiation process in order to establish one coalition that
allows agent DBS to reach the intended goal. As a result
of this process a first coalition is established (figure 13).
Identification: DBS
Availability: 1-1000
Goals:
  DecisionSupSystem
Capacities:
  DevelopOLAP(SGBD) 500 50,
  IntegrateDSS 200 20,
  Software(DBMS) 30 5 1-1000
Plans:
  DecisionSupSystem
    Software(DBMS),
    DevelopDataWharehouse(SGBD),
    DevelopDataMining,
    DevelopOLAP(DBMS),
    IntegrateDSS
    2 < 3, 2 < 4, 3 < 5, 4 < 5,
  OLAPSystem
    Software(DBMS),
    DevelopOLAP (DBMS)
Community A Community B
DBS
DW
AI
ML
NN-1
NN-2
RD
RD
MD
MD
UD
MBMD
MBRD
UD – Unilateral Dependency
MD – Mutual Dependency
RD – Reciprocal Dependency
MBMD – Mutual Believed Mutual Dependency
MBRD – Mutual Believed Reciprocal Dependency
Fig. 12: Identified dependence situations.
Community A Community B
DBS
DW
AI
ML
NN-1
NN-2
DevelopDataMining
DevelopDataWarehouse(DBMS)
Software(DBMS)
DevelopOLAP(DBMS)
IntegrateDSS
Coalition 1
Goal: DecisionSupSystem
Fig. 13: First coalition established.
In this coalition, agent DBS chose to delegate the
activity DevelopDataWarehouse to agent DW and to
delegate the activity DevelopDataMining to agent AI,
executing itself the other activities of the plan6.
When the coalition is established, agent AI verifies
that the activity DevelopDataMining is a non-primitive
activity, adopting it as one of its goals. Therefore, agent
AI will try to establish a coalition to reach that goal. The
result is the establishment of a second coalition, as
presented in figure 14.
Community A Community B
DBS
DW
AI
ML
NN-1
NN-2
DevelopModuleAD(DT)
TestData(DT)
IntegrateDM
Coalition 2
Goal: DevelopDataMining
DevelopModuleNN(DT)
Fig. 14: Second coalition established.
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 The plan to reach the goal DecisionSupSystem is described
in figure 11.
The global result of the simulation is the establishment
of two nested coalitions that allow reaching the DBS
organization’s goal, of developing a decision support
system. The two nested coalitions are presented in figure
15.
Community A Community B
DBS
DW
AI
ML
NN-1
NN-2
Coalition 2
Coalition 1
Fig. 15: Nested coalitions.
In spite of the relative simplicity of the presented
example, it shows some important characteristics of the
implemented system. We can see how the agents,
interacting in a spontaneous and dynamic way, form and
establish coalitions to reach their individual goals, taking
advantage of the complementarity existing among them,
as proposed in the theory of dependence, which is the
base for the proposed social reasoning model. It is also
possible to observe how the proposed model supports the
formation of nested coalitions, allowing to reach goals in
a gradual and dynamic way, without the need of a
previous detailed definition of how to reach them.
Furthermore the DBS agent doesn’t need to contact all the
agents of community B, substantially reducing the
communication effort associated to the whole process of
coalition establishment.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this paper a model of social reasoning was
presented, that extends in some aspects previous models.
In that model a local perspective of coalition formation is
adopted, in which an agent doesn't need to have
knowledge of all the details necessary to reach its goals.
To achieve that, a new definition of external description is
introduced supporting the description of goals, plans and
capacities at different levels of abstraction. In this way,
reaching a goal can originate the formation of different
nested coalitions. In turn, the non-primitive activities are
adopted, in an explicit way, as goals of the agents to
which they were delegated, allowing a larger autonomy of
the agents in their accomplishment, as well as a
significant decrease in the global communication effort.
Another fundamental aspect of the presented model, is the
representation of coalition as a base notion, in a explicit
form. Therefore, it is possible to analyze and negotiate a
coalition as a whole. Also, it facilitates the modularization
of the social reasoning mechanism, to allow the definition
of criteria for coalition evaluation and selection in a
integrated and dynamic way.
Several areas are of great interest for future
developments of the social reasoning model presented,
namely the possibility of commitments revision to handle
possible failures of nested delegations.
Other aspects such as the scalability of the model and
time/cost complexity of the coalition formation process
are of great relevance, and we plan to address them more
deeply in future work. However, the proposed model
already partially considers these aspects by supporting the
definition of execution constraints to limit the number of
valid coalitions that an agent must consider.
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